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Case Number 2000486-CA 
Priority Number 15 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the discretionary ruling of the trial Court as 
provided by Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(h), and by Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial Court correctly rule that the warranty deed executed by Lynn Franklin 
Averett Jackson on August 19, 1997, was effectively delivered? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Inasmuch as the factual issues in this case are not in dispute, the Appellate Court 
reviews the Conclusions of Law for correctness. Meadowbrook ,LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 
115 (Utah 1998). 
Because the facts in this case are not in dispute (Appellant's Brief at pp 5, 13), 
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challenging the trial Court's finding of facts, and marshaling evidence in support of that 
challenge are inappropriate. A trial Court's Findings of Fact are reviewed under a clearly 
erroneous standard. See Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999). Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "[fjindings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES ETC, 
There are no statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretations are 
determinative of the appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 19, 1997, the decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson, executed a 
warranty deed in the presence of the Appellees, his daughters Linda Thomas and Connie 
Rowan. The deed conveyed the home of the decedent to Linda Thomas, Connie Rowan and 
Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson as tenants in common. The deed was placed into a safety 
deposit box after being signed and notarized. The Appellees maintain that though this deed 
was never recorded, a valid delivery of the deed occurred when Decedent gave Linda 
Thomas a key to the safety deposit box where the deed was kept. Appellant Maria Jackson, 
Decedent's wife at the time of his death, maintains that a delivery never occurred, and 
therefore Appellant should be entitled to the entirety of Decedent's home. The parties agreed 
2 
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to set the matter for an evidentiary hearing and prepared a Pre-Trial Order. The matter was 
heard in the probate case before Judge James R. Taylor on April 6, 2000. At the conclusion 
of the trial, Judge Taylor ruled in favor of the Appellees. The Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law were entered the 4th day of May, 2000. Appellant filed an appeal on 
June 5, 2000. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Decedent, Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson, during his life, owned property in 
Utah County, State of Utah, described as follows: 
Commencing 15.70 chains East and 3.94 chains north from the Southwest 
corner of Lot 3 of section 7, Township 8 South, Range 3 East of the Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian; thence North 63 feet; thence East 100 feet; thence South 
63 feet; thence West 100 feet to the place of the beginning. R at 48. 
2. During his life, decedent made an appointment with Richard Coxon, an 
attorney at law, and met with Mr. Coxon with his daughters, Linda Thomas and Connie 
Rown. Rat47. 
3. Decedent was advised by Richard Coxon of the differences between a joint 
tenancy deed, a tenancy in common deed, and the rights of succession. The decedent 
understood the information explained to him by Richard Coxon. R at 47. 
4. Decedent instructed Richard Coxon to prepare a warranty deed which would 
convey his interest in the property set forth in the paragraph above to himself and his 
daughters, Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan, as tenants in common. R at 47. 
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5. The Deed was executed by decedent knowingly and understanding^ on August 
19, 1997 and was notarized the same day. R at 47. 
6. On August 19, 1997, copies of the deed were given to Linda Thomas and 
Connie Rowan by decedent, and the original deed was placed in the decedent's safety 
deposit box. R at 47. R 59 at p 21. 
7. Approximately one or two months later, decedent gave his daughters access 
to the safety deposit box by giving a key to the safety deposit box to Linda Thomas, 
decedent's Personal Representative. R 59 at pp 14, 23-28. 
8. The warranty deed was never recorded. R at 39. 
9. On August 30, 1997, decedent Lynn F. Jackson married Maria Cruzado. The 
day prior to their marriage the two entered into an Anti-Nuptial Marital Property Agreement. 
Rat39, 40. 
10. On January 27, 1998, decedent executed a testamentary document entitled 
"Codicil to Will of Lynn Jackson," which states in part, "My wife will receive the balance 
of my estate." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial Court correctly ruled that by giving Linda Thomas, decedent's Personal 
Representative, a key to his safety deposit box during his lifetime, decedent effectively 
delivered the warranty deed to the Appellees, effecting an inter-vivos transfer of an 
4 
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undivided two-thirds interest in the property to Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan. 
Furthermore, Appellant's arguments are based solely on challenges to the trial Court's 
Findings of Fact and Appellant has failed to meet the burden of proving error in the Trial 
Court's Conclusions of Law concerning the delivery of the deed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTY DEED WAS EFFECTIVELY DELIVERED WHEN THE 
DECEDENT GAVE THE GRANTEES ACCESS TO THE DEED. 
The substantive issue of law in this case is whether giving a grantee access to the 
deed constitutes a valid delivery of the deed. 
At the close of the hearing, the Trial Court stated the following: 
I find by preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Jackson intended to transfer 
his property into one-third interests, and that he did— and by executing the 
deed in the presence of his daughters, the grantees, and causing copies to be 
delivered to them together with giving them access to the safety deposit box 
where he specifically showed them the deed would be kept, that he 
accomplished delivery. R 59 at page 80 line 21- page 81 line 3. 
Though Appellant asserts that the trial Court determined delivery occurred by the "mere 
signing of the deed and giving copies of the deed to his daughters," (Appellant's Brief at 19) 
the Court's ruling shows that giving "access to the safety deposit box" where the deed was 
kept was a key factor in determining delivery. 
Appellant cites Wiggill v. Cheney, 597 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1979), to support the position 
5 
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that a physical delivery of the deed is needed to transfer title. In Wiggill, Lillian Cheney 
signed a deed granting ownership in a certain parcel of property to Flora Cheney as grantee. 
Lillian Cheney then placed the deed in her safety deposit box. She then instructed the 
plaintiff that upon LiUian's death, plaintiff was to go to the bank where he would be granted 
access to the safety deposit box. In detennining that no delivery occurred, the Supreme Court 
stated, "At all times prior to her death, Lillian Cheney was in possession of the key to the 
safety deposit box and had sole and complete control over it. Plaintiff was never given the 
key to the safely deposit box." Id at 1351. 
In the present case, decedent did not have sole and complete control over the safety 
deposit box because decedent gave a key to the box to Linda Thomas. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court concluded in Christensen v. Ogden State Bank, 
286 P. 638 (Utah 1930), that intent to pass title can be manifest by issuing a key to. the 
deposit box. The Court stated: 
If the deceased intended that the title to the savings deposit account should, 
during his life, pass to plaintiff, it is difficult to understand why the deceased 
did not deliver the key to the safety deposit box to his brother or perform some 
other act calculated to make it possible for him to get possession of the 
passbook. Id. at 644. 
In the present case the trial Court found that the decedent took measures during his lifetime 
which pointed to his intent to transfer an undivided two-thirds of his interest in his home to 
his two daughters. The statements of the Supreme Court in both Wiggill and Christensen 
6 
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support the conclusion of the trial Court that issuing to the grantee a key to the safety deposit 
box where the deed was kept constitutes a delivery of the deed. 
kiAgrelins v. Mohesky, 494 P.2d 1095 (Kansas 1972), a case which has a similar fact 
pattern to the present case. The Kansas Supreme Court stated: 
It has been held that delivery is largely a matter of intention, and if the grantor 
by words or acts manifests an intention to divest himself of title and vest it in 
another, it is sufficient to constitute delivery. At 1101. 
and: 
Considering the picture as a whole- and the circumstances in their totality— 
we believe an intention may reasonably be inferred on the part of the grantors 
to effectuate a delivery of the deeds when a key to the lock box was entrusted 
to Clair, i d 
By entrusting to Linda Thomas a key to the safety deposit box where the deed was 
kept, decedent effectively delivered the deed to the Appellees, thus creating an inter-vivos 
transfer of an undivided two-thirds interest in decedent's property to Linda Thomas and 
Connie Rowan. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IS CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND HAS NOT SHOWN ANY LEGAL ERROR IN THE COURT'S RULING 
Point I of Appellant's argument calls into question the decedent's intent to part with 
the possession of the Deed. Point II of Appellant's argument calls into question decedent's 
intent when he issued the key to Linda Thomas. And, Point III of Appellant's argument is 
7 
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an attempt to marshal evidence in support of the Court's position in regards to the granting 
of the key. In each of Appellant's points, Appellant is challenging the Court's Findings of 
Fact. Because the facts in this case are not in dispute, challenging the Court's Finding of 
Facts is inappropriate. 
The Supreme Court provided the following definition of factual issues: "Factual 
questions are generally regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, actions, 
or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as well as subjective, such as state of 
mind." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 at 935 (Utah 1994). Questions as to the decedent's intent 
are factual and deference must be given to the trial Court in determining such factual matters. 
A trial Court's Findings of Fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The clearly 
erroneous standard is highly deferential to the trial Court's decision. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 
936. The trial judge is "considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court 
cannot hope to garner from a cold record." Id. 
In the present case, the trial Court's Findings of Fact are not clearly erroneous. 
Deference must be given to the Court's findings as they pertain to the intent of the decedent 
and under what circumstances the Appellee was given a key to the Decedent's safety deposit 
box. 
Appellant's brief is heavy-laden with factual arguments. Appellant has offered no 
8 
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legal argument to support a claim of an error in the trial Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The trial Court correctly concluded that entrusting a key to the safety 
deposit box legally constituted delivery. As the moving party, Appellant has not met her 
burden of proving legal error. 
CONCLUSION 
Lynn Franklin Averett Jackson, while alive, executed a warranty deed on August 19, 
1997, conveying an undivided interest to himself and his two daughters. The deed was 
delivered. The delivery of the deed completed the transfer of the property from Lynn 
Jackson to himself and his daughters. The property is now owned by the estate of Lynn 
Franklin Averett Jackson and his daughters, Linda Thomas and Connie Rowan. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of the trial judge are not clearly erroneous. The decision of the trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of March, 2001. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT& ESPLIN 
Attorney for Appellee Linda Thomas 
9 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(h) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 3-4 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) 
11 
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COURT OF APPEALS 78-2a-3 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994, 
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch. 
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2Kb) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2Kb) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2Xh) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act* in 
Subsection (4). 
The 1995 amendment, effective May 1,1995, 
substituted "School and Institutional Trust 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Extraordinary writs. 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a 
petition for a writ of mandamus directed 
against a judge of the district court based on its 
authority under this section to enforce compli-
ance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid 
of its appellate jurisdiction. Barnard v. Murphv, 
882 P.2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The term "original" in § 78-2-2(2) adds noth-
ing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction — 
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing 
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals — 
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraor-
dinary writs necessarily invokes a court's juris-
diction to consider a petition originally filed 
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction 
over cases that originated elsewhere. Barnard 
v. Murphy, 882 R2d 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Because, under this section, the Court of 
15 
Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereign 
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the 
executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources'* for "Board of State Lands" in Sub-
section (2Xa). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 159, effective 
July 1, 1996, substituted "Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands" for "Division of Sover-
eign Lands and Forestry" in Subsection (2)(a). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
July 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection (2)(d), 
listing appeals from circuit courts, and redesig-
nated former Subsections (2)(e) to (2)(k) as 
(2)(d) to (2Xj). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 39-6-16. 
ANALYSIS 
Decisions of Board of Pardons. 
Extraordinary writs. 
Final order. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
— Sentence reduction. 
Cited. 
Decisions of Board of Pardons. 
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from 
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, ex-
cept when the petition additionally challenges 
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree 
felony or a capital felony. Then the appeal is to 
be heard by the Supreme Court. Preece v. 
House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994). 
j s$ |p-
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE 
Title I. Applicability of Rules 
Rule 
1. Scope of rules. 
2. Suspension of rules. 
Title II. Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial 
Courts 
3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
6. Bond for costs on appeal. 
7. Security: proceedings against sureties. 
8. Stay or injunction pending appeal. 
9. Docketing statement. 
10. Motion for summary disposition. 
11. The record on appeal. 
12. Transmission of the record. 
13. Notice of filing by clerk. 
Title III. Review and Enforcement of 
Orders of Administrative 
Agencies, Commissions, 
and Committees 
14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; interven-
tion. 
15. 16. {Reserved.] 
17. Stay pending review. 
18. Applicability of other rules to review. 
Title IV. Extraordinary Writs; Habeas Corpus 
19. Extraordinary writs. 
20. Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Title V. General Provisions 
21. Filing and service. 
22. Computation and enlargement of time. 
23. Motions. 
23A. Motion for reinstatement of appeal. 
23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to determina-
tion of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
24. Briefs. 
25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem. 
26. Filing and service of briefs. 
27. Form of briefs. 
28. Prehearing conference. 
28A. Appellate Mediation Office. 
29. Oral argument. 
30. Decision of the court: dismissal; notice of decision. 
31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argument without 
written opinion. 
32. Interest on judgment. 
33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attor-
ney's fees. 
34. Award of costs. 
35. Petition for rehearing. 
36. Issuance of remittitur. 
37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal. 
38. Substitution of parties. 
38A Withdrawal of counsel. 
39. Duties of the clerk. 
40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and discipline. 
Title VI. Certification and Transfer Between Courts 
Rule 
41. Certification of questions of law by United States courts. 
42. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to Court of Appeals. 
43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme 
Court. 
44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals. 
Title VII. Jurisdiction on Writ of Certiorari to Court 
of Appeals 
45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of court of 
appeals. 
46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
47. Certification and transmission of record; joint and sepa-
rate petitions; cross-petitions; parties. 
48. Time for petitioning. 
49. Petition for writ of certiorari. 
50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus curiae. 
51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari. 
Forms 
TITLE I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES 
Rule 1. Scope of rules. 
(a) Applicability of rules. These rules govern the procedure 
before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of Utah in 
all cases. Applicability of these rules to the review of decisions 
or orders of administrative agencies is governed by Rule 18. 
When these rules provide for a motion or application to be 
made in a trial court or an administrative agency, commission, 
or board, the procedure for making such motion or application 
shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the rules of practice of the 
trial court, administrative agency, commission, or board. 
(b) Reference to "court.". Except as provided in Rule 43, 
when these rules refer to a decision or action by the court, the 
reference shall include a panel of the court. The term "trial 
court" means the court or administrative agency, commission, 
or board from which the appeal is taken. The term "appellate 
court" means the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(c) Procedure established by statute. If a procedure is pro-
vided by state statute as to the appeal or review of an order of 
an administrative agency, commission, board, or officer of the 
state which is inconsistent with one or more of these rules, the 
statute shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall apply 
to such appeals or reviews. 
(d) Rules not to affect jurisdiction. These rules shall not be 
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court or Court of Appeals as established by law. 
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah R. App. P. 
Rule 2. Suspension of rules. 
In the interest of expediting a decision, the appellate court, 
on its own motion or for extraordinary cause shown, may, 
except as to the provisions of Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, 
suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in 
a particular case and may order proceedings in that case in 
accordance with its direction. • 
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND 
ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An 
837 
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Rule 4 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 838 £ 
appeal may be taken from a district or juvenile court to the 
appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final 
orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by 
filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 
the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take any 
step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not 
affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such 
action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may 
include dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of 
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are 
entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests 
are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint 
notice of appeal or may join in an appeal of another party after 
filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may 
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court 
upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipula-
tion of the parties to the separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall 
be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the 
appellee. The title of the action or proceeding shall not be 
changed in consequence of the appeal, except where otherwise 
directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the 
appellate court, the party making the original application 
shall be known as the petitioner and any other party as the 
respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall 
specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate 
the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from; shall 
designate the court from which the appeal is taken; and shall 
designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal 
shall give notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving 
personally or mailing a copy thereof to counsel of record of 
each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not 
represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. A certificate evidencing such service shall be 
filed with the notice of appeal. If counsel of record is served, 
the certificate of service shall designate the name of the party 
represented by that counsel. 
(f) Filing fee in civil appeals. At the time of filing any notice 
of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party 
taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court the 
filing fee established by law. The clerk of the trial court shall 
not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing fee is paid. 
- (g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of 
appeal and payment of the required fee, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit a certified copy of the notice 
of appeal, showing the date of its filing, and a copy of the bond 
required by Rule 6 or a certification by the clerk that the bond 
has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt 
of the copy of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall 
be docketed under the title given to the action in the trial 
court, with the appellant identified as such, but if the title 
does not contain the name of the appellant, such name shall be 
added to the title. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which 
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court 
to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory 
forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal 
required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or -• J 
order appealed from. i I 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under I 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by I 
any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 4$| 
52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or 
not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the 
motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for ^ 
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such ** 
motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court under Rule 24 for 
a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from 
the entry of the order denying a new trial. A notice of appeal 
filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall .-;; 
have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be filed within the i -
prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the ... 
trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. y 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as "' 
provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed y" 
after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but :: 
before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial court ^ 
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is 
filed by a party, any other party may file a notice of appeal y-
within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of ^ 
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by '-'.£ 
paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. ":: 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a £-
showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the y, 
time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later '>>•; 
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by -
paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of V?; 
the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court 
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of 
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in ~ 
accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No ^ 
extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 
days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, 
whichever occurs later. -• 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an 
inmate confined in an institution files a notice of appeal in 
either a civil case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is '•* 
timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be 
shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting 
forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage 
has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the manner 
provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in » 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives 
the first notice of appeal. , 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory or-
ders. ^ 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an 
interlocutory order may be sought by any party by filing a 
petition for permission to appeal from the interlocutory order 
with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the 
case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial 
court, with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A 
timely appeal from an order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that the appellate court determines 
is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate court, be 
considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission 
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offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event that 
the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right 
so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not been 
made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is 
not a waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the 
action have moved for directed verdicts. A motion for a 
directed verdict shall state the specific ground(s) therefor. The 
order of the court granting a motion for a directed verdict is 
effective without any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. When-
ever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the 
evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the court 
is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a 
later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a 
party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have 
the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to 
have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a 
directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, 
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move 
for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed 
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this 
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. If 
a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial 
or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had 
been directed. If no verdict was returned the court may direct 
the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been 
directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, 
provided for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the 
court shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by 
determining whether it should be granted if the judgment is 
thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall specify the grounds 
for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the 
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order 
thereon does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the 
motion for a new trial has been conditionally granted and the 
judgment is reversed on appeal, the new trial shall proceed 
unless the appellate court has otherwise ordered. In case the 
motion for a new trial has been conditionally denied, the 
respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings 
shall be in accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for 
a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than ten days after 
entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
(d) Same: denial of motion. If the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed 
on that motion may, as respondent, assert grounds entitling 
him to a new trial in the event the appellate court concludes 
that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses 
the judgment, nothing in this rule precludes it from determin-
ing that the respondent is entitled to a new trial, or from 
directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall 
be granted. 
Rule 51. Instructions to jury; objections. 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the 
court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless 
the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given 
orally or otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions 
are to be given in writing, all objections thereto must be made 
before the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they are 
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its 
verdict. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure 
to give an instruction unless he objects thereto. In objecting to 
the giving of an instruction, a party must state distinctly the 
matter to which he objects and the grounds for his objection. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the appellate 
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may 
review the giving of or failure to give an instruction. Oppor-
tunity shall be given to make objections, and they shall be 
made out of the hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after the 
court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on 
the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the 
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclu-
sive judges of all questions of fact. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially 
and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and 
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memoran-
dum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The court shall, 
however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and 
(b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than one 
ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later 
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion 
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may 
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an objection to such 
findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion 
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except 
in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law 
may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
Rule 53. Masters. 
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all of the issues 
in an action may be referred by the court to a master upon the 
written consent of the parties, or the court may appoint a 
master in an action, in accordance with the provisions of 
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